Under the surface lies a strong moral conviction that the maritime commons in east Asia belong to the PRC. Interviews conducted by the author over the past three years have revealed that this overtly nationalistic stance is not simply condoned on the basis of a quest for cultural superiority, but rather supported as a necessary response to the failure of past efforts at accommodation under the Hu Jintao regime. A commonly held view among Chinese foreign policy experts is that sincere diplomatic efforts at reassuring states over China's peaceful rise have not been appreciated; joint development has not worked because Chinese companies have been discriminated against; and the United States, despite its language of neutrality with respect to maritime disputes, continues to take sides with other claimant states.
In the current ideological climate, it is increasingly difficult to arrive at a balanced analysis of China's naval modernization drive. Given that China's maritime power is now deeply ingrained within the national psyche, naval modernization is no longer simply a question of keeping pace with economic growth, but lies at the heart of debates over China's rightful status in the world. On this basis, any careful examination is inevitably fraught with contradictions and ambiguities. It is now difficult to conceive of a future in which maritime power is not a central feature of China's expanding global presence.
In today's China, naval modernization and the development of the maritime economy are closely intertwined. Until recently, naval modernization was proceeding at a measured pace, based upon a conception of national peace and development. Building upon this trend, major advances are now taking place in undersea warfare, with a focus upon nuclear submarines and sea mines. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and William S. Currently, China has an expanding submarine programme for the purpose of defending against foreign navies as well as protecting its broader maritime rights.
Its total number of submarines, of all class types, rose to 56 in Caution is still needed in assessments of the quality of China's naval capabilities as well as of the scope of its naval ambition. Efforts are already under way to extend its reach beyond the first island chain into the western Pacific, through the waterway between the Miyako and Okinawa islands. In the east Asia littoral, China's maritime rights enforcement strategy is more difficult to determine because of the number of agencies involved. China's naval buildup has coincided with the expansion of maritime patrols under the newly created China Coast Guard Administration.
Following the National People's Congress in March , the State Oceanic Administration Guojia Haiyang Ju took administrative control over four existing maritime law enforcement bodies in pursuit of a greater degree of coordination and accountability, especially at times of crisis. The Maritime Safety Administration remains under the Ministry of Transport with special control over foreign flagships in Chinese waters and research and rescue operations.
A National Maritime Affairs Committee Guojia haiyang shiwu weiyuanhui under the leadership of Xi Jinping assumes overall leadership in strengthening interagency coordination. However, specific mandates and lines of authority between agencies remain blurred in practice.
For detailed surveys of internal struggles over maritime enforcement, see Linda Jakobson, China's unpredictable maritime security actors , Lowy Institute for International Policy report Sydney, 11 Dec. China's coastguard fleet is now the world's largest, with increasing numbers of —3, ton vessels capable of conducting longer patrols on the high seas and in disputed waters far from the coast. In emulating the coastal defences of the United States and Japan, this enhanced paramilitary force carries light weaponry to enforce maritime surveillance.
But it lacks an overall legal framework, and PLAN acts as a shield protecting the coastguard vessels in disputed waters, thus obscuring the boundaries of legitimate coastal defence. The policy framework, presented in a joint report by the National Development and Reform Commission, MoFA and the Ministry of Commerce, brings together the respective missions of the three agencies: namely, to expand and deepen China's opening to the outside world; to strengthen integration and connectedness between Asia, Europe and Africa; and to contribute to the peaceful development of humankind.
It is still unclear from current Chinese documentation how exactly China's domestic priorities can be leveraged successfully to promote a positive transformation of transregional order.
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Others are more sanguine, highlighting the potential collective benefits to be derived from addressing infrastructural bottlenecks and regional conflicts on the basis of economic interventions. But it is unlikely that the new strategy will act as a substitute for the absence of positive Chinese engagement in the South China Sea.
In the more immediate future, confronted by scepticism on all sides, the Chinese leadership will be forced to tread a very fine line between projecting its interests across the Eurasian continent and protecting the waterways. On this account, Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy initiative confirms rather than repudiates the argument presented in this article for a stronger legitimate maritime order in east Asia. In linking China's ambition to the wider question of maritime order, the analysis presented in this article suggests that the quest for maritime hegemony is not the central driver of Chinese actions in the South China Sea.
In combination, these mixed motives offer a means of consolidating China's strategic status as a maritime power while balancing wider diplomatic, political and economic interests. What the analysis brings to the surface are the legitimacy stakes involved in China's maritime rejuvenation. More specifically, it confirms the relevance of legitimacy as a key attribute in China's broader quest for maritime status.
In terms of the broader regional social dynamics, rising tensions in the South China Sea cannot be attributed exclusively to any single actor, no matter how recalcitrant, or seemingly aggressive, it appears in the eyes of other stakeholders. An action—reaction dynamic between states is a major impetus behind the upward trend in the escalation of conflict. Hence a sharper focus upon the likely constraints and opportunities involved in developing a more durable maritime order based upon social consent provides a means of redirecting attention towards positive engagement while remaining acutely aware of the key constraints involved.
Is a legitimate maritime order possible? Here I offer three key observations, drawing upon the framework presented earlier that brings together power dynamics, institutional mediation and conflict prevention. First, we are witnessing a breakdown of the boundary between maritime freedoms and national security that is leading to an escalation of strategic competition between the United States and China. Clearly, strategic reassurances are required on the part of both states over the limits of their national ambitions in maritime east Asia.
Chinese attempts to secure strategic space on its maritime periphery have created a classical security dilemma—when military or diplomatic actions taken by one state to reduce vulnerability are seen by other states as threatening, thus leading to a spiral of unintended provocations—with the buildup of military forces on a regional scale.
To adopt Homer's Greek metaphor, adapting to changing power dynamics under these conditions is like crossing the perilous Messina Strait: navigating between the Scylla of power competition and the Charybdis of maritime nationalism a dilemma rendered into Chinese as jintuiliangnan. In practical terms, navigating this dilemma requires shifting to a new paradigm of collective responsibility that places an obligation upon all states to unite national security with the broader imperative of safeguarding the maritime commons.
Here it is worth restating a fundamental principle of the law of the sea among nations, first articulated in by a Maltese diplomat, Arvid Pardo, in an impassioned speech to the UN General Assembly at the height of superpower Cold War rivalry:. On the eve of the 50th anniversary of this propitious occasion in diplomatic history, a renewed commitment to the demilitarization of the South China Sea—inclusive of disputed maritime features and the deep sea—is now of central importance in mitigating the buildup of strategic and economic competition.
Building upon the recent success in establishing a US—China climate partnership, this would represent a significant step forward in sharing responsibility for safeguarding the global commons. Second, maritime rights and entitlements dominate the regional agenda, leading to weak maritime security governance. Yet, across the region, political and diplomatic engagement in maritime affairs is now heavily circumscribed by maritime nationalism.
Historical legacies and rising consciousness over maritime rights, in part driven by UNCLOS deadlines, are currently reinforcing national security imperatives over collective gains. More fundamentally, a weak consensus over collective obligations is undermining the potential to respond to the multiple security challenges now facing the region. At the consultative and functional levels, arrangements are in place to facilitate greater regional cooperation over maritime security.
The ASEAN—China Maritime Consultative Mechanism, the marine electronic highway in the Malacca Strait and the regional cooperation agreement on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia provide pertinent examples. An important question is how to establish regional governing mechanisms that are likely to endure. For this to happen, a concerted effort is required on the part of China and ASEAN to finalize the proposed code of conduct and thereby pave the way for a broader and more inclusive political framework aimed at strengthening maritime security governance.
In short, the creation of a stable and legitimate maritime order depends as much upon the equality of obligation as it does upon the equality of entitlement. Third, a regional strategy for conflict prevention has yet to emerge. In the absence of a strong regional capacity for preventing and managing conflicts, the hope of a legitimate maritime order rapidly diminishes.
Under present conditions in the South China Sea, attention is predominantly focused upon avoiding strategic miscalculations and the rather elusive task of building trust to reduce uncertainty. A more active and enlightened response would be to initiate a collective process to counter the buildup of tensions over time. In the first instance, one important step forward would be to galvanize efforts towards the construction of an integrated regional strategy for preventing maritime conflicts in all guises.
Responding to an incident in May when Filipino coastguards shot and killed a member of a Taiwanese crew in a fishing boat in the Luzon Strait, the Philippines and Taiwan signed an agreement on 5 November to cooperate over law enforcement. It seeks to avoid the unnecessary use of force by establishing an emergency notification system, and introducing protocols to ensure the prompt release of detained vessels and crew.
Given that this particular incident took place just 24 nautical miles off the Philippine coast where the EEZs of both parties overlap, the agreement constitutes an important breakthrough in conflict prevention. These key constraints and suggestions for moving forward merit further investigation.
For the purposes of this article, they raise awareness of the need for a multilayered response to the maritime crisis that recognizes the value of building social consent. Based upon my earlier premise, high political stakes are involved in maintaining a balance between order and legitimacy in maritime east Asia. If this cannot be achieved, there exists a serious risk that the region will become mired in endless struggles over maritime sovereignty that further fan the flames of power competition and nationalism.
Building a more legitimate and peaceful maritime order is not beyond the realm of the possible. But it will require a political framework that can both mediate the concerns of major powers in the region and address the mounting challenges of maritime security affecting all states and peoples. This article has taken a new approach towards interpreting China's ambition in the South China Sea by taking into account the broader transformation of maritime order. Even if we view the maritime order in east Asia in strictly realist terms, it is evident that legitimacy concerns are already affecting the underlying conflict dynamics in the region, further undermining the prospects for collective action.
In Asia, it must combine a balance of power with a concept of partnership. The equilibrium that I have in mind is more reflective of expanding maritime interests and obligations, as well as cognizant of the political imperative for social consent between major powers and among the littoral states of maritime east Asia. A dynamic conception of maritime order that allows for political adjustments over time is more likely to endure.
Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command
In the South China Sea this requires a multilayered framework that recognizes a threefold need to adapt to evolving maritime power dynamics, to respond to rising maritime security challenges and to strengthen conflict management. So where does China fit in? While a pattern of confrontation and engagement underpins the Chinese strategy, an overriding concern with maritime nationalism now determines both rhetoric and action. Consequently, the maritime rejuvenation project is now incurring serious legitimacy deficits that are likely to constrain unilateral action in the immediate future.
More worrying for Beijing is the fact that its recent actions aimed at securing strategic space in the maritime domain have proved to be counterproductive, consolidating rather than displacing US centrality in regional security. A major risk is that the current spiral of confrontation will provoke the United States to discount the legitimacy stakes involved and succumb to the use of force in a bid to deter Chinese ambition. As many analysts have noted, the preservation of US dominance in the region is not a prerequisite for future regional stability, which instead requires a more equitable balance of power between the United States and China.
Equally, any strategy seeking to build an exclusive maritime order that denies China political influence as an emerging maritime power is misguided. It runs the risk of generating a parallel Sinocentric order by default. The Chinese leadership is already seeking to shape the strategic environment by appealing to Asian cultural norms and expressions of civilizational identity that run counter to a common East—West maritime consensus.
What we are confronting in this part of the world is one of the defining diplomatic and strategic challenges of the contemporary era—China integrating more deeply into the evolving maritime order on the basis of mutual security and collective responsibility. Volume 92 , Issue 4. Special Issue: Chinese foreign policy on trial: contending perspectives? The full text of this article hosted at iucr. If you do not receive an email within 10 minutes, your email address may not be registered, and you may need to create a new Wiley Online Library account.
If the address matches an existing account you will receive an email with instructions to retrieve your username. International Affairs Volume 92, Issue 4. Original articles Open Access. Search for more papers by this author. Tools Request permission Export citation Add to favorites Track citation. Share Give access Share full text access.
Share full text access. Please review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article. Abstract China's expanding presence in the South China Sea is now a major source of escalating tensions leading to a spiral of confrontation with the United States and the littoral states of east Asia. On legitimate maritime order 8 8 The idea of a legitimate maritime order is presented here as a preliminary framework for the purpose of illuminating both the constraints on China's maritime ambition and the potential for a stronger equilibrium between power and legitimacy in maritime east Asia.
It is inspired by the work of International Relations scholars focusing on the relationship between legitimacy and the balance of power as well as international legal scholars addressing the evolution of international order. Even one of the founding philosophers of political realism, Thomas Hobbes — , strongly advocated good government of the people by avoiding unnecessary wars: Salus populi suprema lex : by which must be understood, not the mere preservation of their lives, but generally their benefit and good. Figure 1 Open in figure viewer PowerPoint. Legal arbitration At a broader level, a major problem for the Chinese leadership is that legal ambiguity over its maritime boundaries no longer serves a purpose in maintaining the regional status quo.
Controlling access to resources China's dispute with Vietnam highlights the continuing importance of competition over resources. US—China strategic competition: freedom of the seas vs national security A central driver in the buildup of geostrategic rivalry between the United States and China in the South China Sea concerns the question of how to reconcile navigational access and freedom of the seas with national security.
In a press release issued on 16 June , Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang defended the Chinese position in fairly strident tones: [land reclamation activities are] lawful, reasonable, and justified … they are not targeted at any other country, do not affect the freedom of navigation and overflight enjoyed by all countries in accordance with international law in the South China Sea, nor have they caused or will they cause damage to the marine ecological system and environment in the South China Sea, and are thus beyond reproach.
Naval modernization It is now difficult to conceive of a future in which maritime power is not a central feature of China's expanding global presence. Conclusion This article has taken a new approach towards interpreting China's ambition in the South China Sea by taking into account the broader transformation of maritime order. Volume 92 , Issue 4 Special Issue: Chinese foreign policy on trial: contending perspectives?
July Pages Figures Related Information. Close Figure Viewer. Browse All Figures Return to Figure. Previous Figure Next Figure. Email or Customer ID. Forgot password? Widely quoted and attributed, but without a documented source. Hence, we will not say that Greeks fight like heroes, but that heroes fight like Greeks. Allegedly said regarding a Greek victory over Italian invaders, but without a documented source.
Misattributed [ edit ] The Balkans produce more history than they can consume also reported in the form: The peoples of the Balkans produce more history than they can consume, and the weight of their past lies oppressively on their present. Although widely attributed to Winston Churchill e. They must manage them as best they can. That might be true of nuclear proliferation, but no such excuses can be made for the European Union's activities at the end of the Cold War. It faced a task so obvious and achievable as to count as an almost explicit duty laid down by History: namely, the speedy incorporation of the new Central European democracies--Poland, Hungary and what was then Czechoslovakia--within the EU's economic and political structures.
Early entry into Europe was the wish of the new democracies; it would help to stabilize them politically and smooth their transition to market economies; and it would ratify the post-Cold War settlement in Europe. Given the stormy past of that region-- the inhabitants are said to produce more history than they can consume locally --everyone should have wished to see it settled economically.
Old gentlemen with bad memories said it reminded them of Disraeli. All Indian leaders will be of low calibre and men of straw. They will have sweet tongues and silly hearts. They will fight amongst themselves for power and India will be lost in political squabbles. Often cited as from a speech "on the eve of Indian Independence in ", e. May have first appeared in the Annual Report of P. Oak 's discredited "Institute for Rewriting Indian History" in , and is now quoted in at least three books, as well as countless media and websites. There is no such thing as a good tax.
Though it is often attributed to Churchill, there is no evidence he ever said it. If you're not a liberal when you're 25, you have no heart. If you're not a conservative by the time you're 35, you have no brain. Furthermore, the Churchill Centre , on its Falsely Attributed Quotations page, states "there is no record of anyone hearing Churchill say this. He'd been a Conservative at 15 and a Liberal at 35! And would he have talked so disrespectfully of Clemmie, who is generally thought to have been a lifelong Liberal?
Show me a young conservative and I'll show you someone with no heart. Show me an old liberal and I'll show you someone with no brains. If you are not a socialist by the time you are 25, you have no heart. If you are still a socialist by the time you are 35, you have no head.
The fascists of the future will be called anti-fascists. According to research  , it has been attributed to Churchill since the 21st century. There is nothing better for the inside of a man than the outside of a horse. According to The quote verifier: who said what, where, and when , Keyes, Macmillan, p. An empty taxi arrived and out of it stepped Attlee. When he heard about that misattribution he said: Mr Attlee is an honourable and gallant gentleman, and a faithful colleague who served his country well at the time of her greatest need. I should be obliged if you would make it clear whenever an occasion arises that I would never make such a remark about him, and that I strongly disapprove of anybody who does.
All this contains much that is obviously true, and much that is relevant; unfortunately, what is obviously true is not relevant , and what is relevant is not obviously true. This is not by Churchill, but a paraphrase of Churchill quoting Arthur James Balfour in Great Contemporaries : 'there were some things that were true, and some things that were trite; but what was true was trite, and what was not trite was not true'. You make a living by what you get; you make a life by what you give. Variant: We make a living by what we get, we make a life by what we give. Extensive research of writings by and about Churchill at the Churchill Centre fails to indicate that Churchill ever spoke or wrote those words.
Some sites list Norman MacEwen as the originator of the quote. The further backward you look, the further forward you can see.
Langworth, PublicAffairs, p. The attribution of the mistaken form of the quote to Churchill dates from at least Don't talk to me about naval tradition. It's nothing but rum, sodomy, and the lash. According to Churchill's assistant, Anthony Montague-Browne, Churchill had not coined this phrase, but wished he had. Film producer Alexander Korda asked Churchill in if he had made the remark, he replied No, I didn't say it; but I'm sorry I didn't, because it was quite witty … and so true!
Quoted in Nigel Rees , Sayings of the Century p. People often forget that in there was no guarantee that we were going to win. This quote is actually from Churchill's daughter, Lady Soames. Claiborne Robins. Claiborne Robins School of Business, one of the most highly regarded programs of the university today. Boston College might have the fastest growing endowment of any college on this list. Boston College is ranked 38 on the U. Ranked the 89 on the U. The large flagship campus at IU—Bloomington is known for several top—ranked programs, including its Jacobs School of Music, which boasts the second—largest enrollment of all music schools accredited by the National Association of Schools of Music.
Like so many other post—Civil War industrialists, Andrew Carnegie sought to found a university as part of a large philanthropic campaign. About half of the annual research budget comes from government agencies such as the National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense.
Dietrich in When Williams College 36 on this list was experiencing financial difficulties in the s, Amherst College was founded as what was assumed would be a replacement. Fortunately, both colleges proved to be a success. A poll found that Founded in , Pomona College is an extremely selective school with admissions prerequisites comparable to many Ivy League colleges. Founded in , the university is well known for several programs, most notably music, medicine, and science, and ranks as the 79th—best in the world. The Institute of Optics, founded in , was the first educational program dedicated entirely to optics, while the Laboratory for Laser Energetics is the second most energetic fusion laser in the world.
Boston University BU is a well—respected private research university ranked 66 among the best universities in the world. To remain competitive among other notable Boston institutions, Boston University benefits greatly from its long list of notable alumni donors. The university consists of two urban campuses, both of which are located on prime Boston city real estate. The university was originally founded by iconic industrialist John D. Originally founded in by Quakers, Swarthmore College has a long history of being well respected.
The first college to graduate a woman with a degree in philosophy was also one of the first co—educational schools in the United States, and is today ranked the third—best liberal arts college in the country by U. Uniquely, Swarthmore belongs to a Tri—College Consortium, a cooperative arrangement with Bryn Mawr and Haverford Colleges, in which the schools share class enrollment opportunities and an integrated library system of more than three million volumes.
Tied as number three on the U. Ranking as the 35th—best university in the nation with U. The university continues to expand both its size and value. Founded in as Iowa College, Grinnell College experienced several setbacks in its early years, including the Civil War and a devastating tornado. A private liberal arts college, Grinnell College ranks as 11 among the best Liberal Arts Colleges in the country, according to U.
Virginia Commonwealth University has a long history of healthcare—related research. Originally, founded in as the medical department of Hampden—Sydney College, it went through stints as the Medical College of Virginia and the Richmond Professional Institute, before becoming what it is today in To progress its research mission, the university funds a wide variety of highly respected centers and institutes, involving faculty from disciplines in public policy, biotechnology, and healthcare discoveries.
Founded in , the University of California, Berkeley, is the best known school of the University of California system, and the 12th—best ranked university in the world. A founding member of the Association of American Universities, UC Berkeley is known for very high research activity, and an equally high research budget. Notable alumni include J. Case Western Reserve University is a private research university that has produced quite a lot of wealth in its time. Surrounding the university are several other educational, medical, and cultural institutions, some of which are owned by Case Western.
The university is best known for its programs in bioengineering, biomedical engineering, biology, biological sciences, and medicine, and was only the second school in the U. Case Western Reserve is ranked 85 among the best universities in the world. Ranked as 11 among the best national liberal arts colleges by U. Originally founded in , Tufts University is a private university well known as a respected research institution.
In addition to its main campus located just outside of Boston, Tufts includes three other campuses in Massachusetts and one in the French Alps. Though it offers more than programs, Tufts is especially well—known for its degrees in international relations, art studies, and economics. Currently, ranked by U. The school enjoys a healthy donor pool, as well, including former L. Dodgers owner Frank H. McCourt, Jr. University of Kansas KU is the largest and wealthiest research university in the state of Kansas.
There are five campuses throughout the state, including the flagship campus in Lawrence. The school is ranked first among public universities in enrollment of National Merit Scholars, and among the top 10 in the graduation of Rhodes Scholars. The 3,—acre campus includes two prominent museums: the Fred Jones Jr. Originally founded in with just one campus in Lincoln, the University of Nebraska system now consists of five campuses located throughout the state.
Lincoln, however, has remained its flagship and is the largest research university of the bunch. The campus that took up only four city blocks in now consists of two campuses on nearly 3, city acres. Comprised of four campuses across the state, in Columbia, St. Louis, Rolla, and Kansas City, the University of Missouri System traces its origins to the establishment of the Columbia campus in With a unique botanical garden that spans the campus and includes more than 40, plants, the flagship Columbia campus offers well—regarded education, business, medicine, and law programs.
Founded as the Toland Medical College in , before becoming incorporated with the University of California in , UCSF has since become a renowned and wealthy medical university. In , it received what is not only the largest donation in school history, but one of the largest in U. That museum adjoins the George W. Bush Institute, a library and presidential museum administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. Named for philanthropist Joseph Sterling Bridwell, the library is one of the leading theological research collections in the United States.
Known for well—regarded business programs, and ranked as the 80th—best university in the country by U. Washington and Lee is the ninth—oldest institution of higher learning in the United States, and as such it has a long history of interesting and historically significant financial backing. In fact, its first major donor was President George Washington, who in endowed the then—struggling university with a gift of stock large enough to warrant the renaming of the university after him.
Washington and Lee is ranked by U. As the oldest university in the state, it has racked up quite a bit of wealth and accolades in its time. Ranked 89th on the U. It currently ranks as the 53rd—best university in the world; not surprising, considering UBC boasts seven Nobel Prize—winners, 69 Rhodes Scholars, 65 Olympic medalists, two Canadian Prime Ministers, and Royal Society of Canada fellows among its faculty and alumni. Additionally, with a research budget of nearly a half—billion dollars, the university is able to fund upwards of 8, projects per year.
University of Alabama was one of the first public universities established in the early—nineteenth—century southwestern frontier of the United States, and over the past years has made a significant cultural imprint on the state, region, and nation. Founded in , the Crimson Tide ranks as one of the top 10 highest—winning sports franchises in United States history.
UD has several top—ranking programs, including engineering, education, business, city management, mathematics, and public affairs.
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Its doctoral program is also ranked among the best in the nation, according to both U. Not only was this donation the largest since , it was the largest ever to be given to the College of Engineering. In addition to its status as one of the top private schools in the nation, Tulane University has enjoyed some of the largest donations to a college in recent history. Sophie Newcomb Memorial College.